The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded
Perspectives on Learning
Volume 19 Winter 2013-2014

Article 4

2013

Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: How Composition’s Social
Construction Reinstates Expressivist Solipsism (And Even
Current-Traditional Conservatism)
Keith Rhodes
Grand Valley State University, rhodekei@gvsu.edu

Monica M. Robinson
Grand Valley State University, robinsmo@gvsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/jaepl
Part of the Creative Writing Commons, Curriculum and Instruction Commons, Curriculum and Social
Inquiry Commons, Disability and Equity in Education Commons, Educational Methods Commons,
Educational Psychology Commons, English Language and Literature Commons, Instructional Media
Design Commons, Liberal Studies Commons, Other Education Commons, Special Education and Teaching
Commons, and the Teacher Education and Professional Development Commons

Recommended Citation
Rhodes, Keith and Robinson, Monica M. (2013) "Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: How Composition’s Social
Construction Reinstates Expressivist Solipsism (And Even Current-Traditional Conservatism)," The Journal
of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning: Vol. 19 , Article 4.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/jaepl/vol19/iss1/4

This article is brought to you freely and openly by Volunteer, Open-access, Library-hosted Journals (VOL Journals),
published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted
for inclusion in The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning by an authorized editor. For
more information, please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/jaepl.

Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: How Composition’s Social Construction Reinstates
Expressivist Solipsism (And Even Current-Traditional Conservatism)
Cover Page Footnote
Keith Rhodes is an Associate Professor and the Director of First-year Composition at Grand Valley State
University. A former business lawyer, he has served as Secretary of the Council of Writing Program
Administrators, as book review editor for JAEPL, and as a member of the five-person Steering Committee
that finalized the original CWPA Outcomes Statement for First-year Composition. Perhaps as a result of
his attachment to American pragmatist philosophy, his scholarship tends, though not exclusively, toward
practical matters like teaching style and modifying business-world thinking for use in composition
administration. (rhodekei@gvsu.edu) Monica McFawn Robinson is an Affiliate Professor of Writing at
Grand Valley State University, where she teaches both composition and creative writing. Her scholarly and
creative output spans from pedagogy to fiction and playwriting. Her most recent pedagogical inquiry has
been on how classroom game design can benefit the teaching of writing. Her fiction and poetry has been
published in several literary journals, and her collection of short stories, Bright Shards of Someplace Else,
to be published by University of Georgia Press in 2014, won the 2013 Flannery O’ Connor Award.
(robinsmo@gvsu.edu)

This essay is available in The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning:
https://trace.tennessee.edu/jaepl/vol19/iss1/4

JAEPL, Vol. 19, Winter 2013-2014

Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: How Composition’s Social
Construction Reinstantiates Expressivist Solipsism
(And Even Current-Traditional Conservativism)
Keith Rhodes and Monica McFawn Robinson

T

he main premise of this article is that social construction, under the guise of
being the radical wolf that will empower teachers and students alike, has instead promoted a pervasive sheepishness, a passive disinterest in large-scale progress in
composition studies. While social construction ostensibly offers a contextually-sensitive
open field for scholars and teachers, its practical effect has been to fragment composition
studies by encouraging ultra-specific scholarship that does not readily cohere into shared
knowledge. We believe that social construction is fundamentally a form of Romanticism,
enabling not only the solipsism of which its advocates once accused “expressivists,”1 but
also the conservatism for which expressivists once excoriated current-traditionalists. And
while some scholarship has clearly turned away from social construction in recent years,
we believe that its influence continues—most obviously in the durable arguments against
the “positivism” of data collection.
We believe that reframing social construction through a Romantic/Classic lens
might clarify the roots and the lasting consequences of the theory’s enduring appeal.
Composition’s long-standing resistance to data-rich research approaches, fully explored
by Richard Haswell (“NCTE/CCCC’s”), is one of the most prominent signs of social
construction’s Romanticism, and our essay aims to untangle both the philosophical causes
and practical effects of this orientation. Finally, we invoke a different line of thinking
available from the beginning of these disputes, Robert Pirsig’s “metaphysics of quality,”
as a compelling example of one possible way out of the feedback loop of current social
construction and into a more progressive and responsive philosophy.
We pause here for an important preliminary note. During the course of trying to
publish this article, here and in other journals, we met with criticism from several reviewers
for not outlining social construction theory with complete care before forwarding our
own argument. We want to make clear that this perceived omission is by design. While it
might be academic custom to sum up previous studies to prove one’s credibility, there are
two reasons why we have streamlined that part of our article. First, we contend that social
construction is such a nebulous theory that attempting to pin it down would take an
article in itself. That is indeed one of the problems with social construction that we directly
1

We will follow the convential labels for different movements in the field of composition, but
we cannot let pass the fact that “expressivists” have never so labeled themselves. The term is a
curious case of the kind of diminishing “othering” that social constructionists decry when used
in other social settings. In drafts, the authors were frequently tempted to write asides arguing
against the unfair trivialization of the actual writings and thinking of Elbow, Macrorie, and
others so labeled, an injustice that bothers the authors even if neither of them holds particularly
close to that style of pedagogy. Keeping our critique focused on social construction requires that
we deal with what social constructionists see themselves as doing, so we will focus on their own
construction of “expressivism.”
8

Rhodes and Robinson/ Social Construction

address below. Because social construction can encompass so many modes and directions,
and because its very nature eschews judging claims by any means other than popularity, it
has rendered itself nearly immune to a clear reassessment or even summary. The muddy,
shape-shifting nature of social construction is one of the very things we discuss at length
in our article, and wading into all of that at the onset would have distracted from our
purpose, which is to demystify the basic orientation of the theory. Secondly, we believe
that the demand itself is unreasonable and hegemonic, considering how often discussion
in the profession simply assumes the primacy of the theory. Nobody can miss the reign
of this cloudy theory, nor can anyone miss how closely that reign has corresponded with
what Haswell has clearly documented as a “war” on scholarship from other perspectives in
the pages of the field’s most central and powerful organizational journals. We appreciate
that the editors of JAEPL have permitted this admittedly contentious argument simply
to go forward.
Social Construction’s Well-Constructed House of Cards
The root of the problem with social construction is easily stated: if reality is what
the discourse community says it is, then what the present community believes is, by
definition, right. The only way to enter the conversation is to join the established incrowd. The best way to do that is to show allegiance to its beliefs. Thus, social construction
is functionally tautological; by such means cults are born. The further credo has become
that all knowledge is local (Huot 105), so that all judgments need to be made within
local discourse communities and are essentially incommensurate. That is, in-crowds can
proliferate and become their own judges of what’s best locally. By that means, social
constructionists render themselves beyond critique. Who is to say what is better or best
locally? As long as one declares fealty to the larger dogma of social construction, we’re all
right. We’re also incapable of producing what Richard Haswell called “RAD” research—
replicable and aggregable (neither is relevant if everything is local), and data-supported
(that is, suspiciously “positivist”) research—information that might inform some of us,
sometimes, that we are wrong. Hence, within the construct of social construction, nobody
can ever be wrong, except by rejecting social construction itself. We do not mean to be
snarky by using the term “in-crowd”; we earnestly believe it accurately represents the exact
philosophical situation in a way that the field should confront more overtly.
The inability to declare anything wrong has real and interesting consequences. For
example, many leading lights in rhetoric and composition cooperated with the American
Association of Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) in constructing its “VALUE” rubric
on writing. AAC&U is itself a responsive and responsible academic organization. While
the resulting rubric has many good features, it makes the curious claim that the number
of errors in student writing steadily declines through a student’s college career. In fact,
close study indicates that error rates remain close to constant throughout writing careers,
even though the nature of the errors changes as students’ syntactic abilities develop
(Haswell, Gaining Ground 191-205). As Haswell explains, growth in other dimensions of
writing tends to produce new kinds of errors, particularly at the early stages of learning.
But without careful attention to research—and an attitude that it matters—potentially
misleading “lore” like the decline of error cannot really be challenged. Indeed, social
9
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construction offers no path to challenge “folk wisdom.” Thus, even our best and brightest
can be coerced into accepting demonstrably false lore.
Composition scholarship has produced little new knowledge about how writers
make gains throughout the reign of social construction. Without a full philosophical
shift, neither will it be likely to persuade more realist or idealist audiences that it has
anything to offer to anyone outside its circle—which circle does not necessarily, or even
with much likelihood, include the students who encounter composition briefly in an early
stage of their college careers. Far from having the sort of radicalizing social influence that
social constructionists ironically idealize, social construction has mainly established a way
for composition practitioners to insulate themselves from stumbling across the kinds of
accumulating anomalies that, as Kuhn pointed out, become the force that drives paradigm
change. Composition has built itself the perfect rut. Furthermore, social construction
incinerates any ground for complaint about standards imposed on us by any outside
forces. After all, these outsiders to us are simply insiders in other discourse communities,
constructing other realities. If they think their reality includes us and controls ours—and
if they have the power to insist on that—social construction offers no principled basis for
saying otherwise.
The main advantages of social construction have been in the professionalization of
composition itself, of course. By proper operation of its own theories, once one joins
the social constructionist in-crowd, the tickets of advancement become more readily
available. Those who are good at social moves advance, entering the position to advance
the similarly oriented and gifted. But this interesting professional game would seem to
have no practical ends. It threatens to offer status as its own end. Of course, in plain fact
many scholars do a great deal of practical and progressive work, essentially ignoring the
social constructionist credo even while paying it homage, at least implicitly. Nevertheless,
the logic of social construction predicts that we should end up with exactly what we have:
more tenured specialists, but few advances in pedagogical methods, few measurable results
from improved practices, and little over-all progress for the field of writing even in its
political status. Given that composition teaching has been pushed constantly to the lowest
economic levels, for most students in most first-year writing courses, writing remains the
writing of “Engfish” (Macrorie 1) for processing by contingently-employed teachers who
have little hope of ever joining or engaging the full professional apparatus that has built
itself around the social contructivist paradigm.
Zen and the Art of Composition Theory: Using Pirsig’s Lens to Examine Social Construction’s Move towards Radical Romanticism
We have found an unusual value in looking at the enterprise in light of Robert Pirsig’s
related attempt to unravel the problem of avoiding a Romantic-Classical oscillation,
essentially the same problem that drove the field of composition to social construction.
Pirsig carefully examines the nature of Romanticism as part of an inquiry arising out of his
experience teaching college composition—which he steadfastly calls, presciently for 1974,
“teaching rhetoric.” His central question was this: How do we know when we are teaching
Quality in writing? As Pirsig relentlessly and copiously demonstrates, we seem to know it
when we see it, but everyone has trouble explaining it. Pirsig’s most concrete realization
10
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is that conversations about this topic mainly bog down in an endless argument between
Classicists, who believe Quality results if we quantify and technologize the results, and
Romantics, who believe that quantification and mechanization necessarily destroy the
Quality that we seek. His focus, given the times, is mainly on the irrational resistance of
Romantics to anything technical—typified by his cycling companions’ aversion to learning
how to maintain their own motorcycle, a reaction against the technologies that so largely
define our lives. There are clear parallels between the attitudes of those who want to drive
motorcycles without maintenance and the attitudes of those want to teach composition
without any resort to empirical study or discussion of standards. Large factions of the
field decry as “postivitists” anyone who wants to open up the “engine” of teaching and
learning and start taking things apart to see how they work. The collective behavior of our
published scholars has remained decidedly on the Romantic side of Pirsig’s split, with the
attraction to information technologies representing less a shift to the “Classical” side than
a sensible adaptation to new social realities.
Romanticism, as Pirsig describes it, covers a constellation of attitudes, all positioned
in opposition to Classical thinking. Preliminarily, he describes Romantics as “inspirational,
imaginative, creative, intuitive” and proceeding not by “reason or by laws” but by “feeling,
intuition, and aesthetic conscience” (85). Romantics therefore reject systematic, scientific
thinking as “inhuman, mechanical, lifeless, a blind monster, a death force” (19). Pirsig uses
the phrase “blind monster” as the Romantic’s summary of the Classical view, a view both
cold and indiscriminate, a steamrolling objectivity that oppresses rather than clarifies.
Along with their suspicion of systematic thinking, Romantics aim to be independent of
oppressive social systems, including government and bureaucracies. As Pirsig puts it, a
Romantic revolts against being “a mass person” (21). Finally, Romantics do not believe
Quality can be quantified. It cannot be broken down or measured. Even the attempt does
violence, as all measurement by its very nature leaves something out. Ultimately, they see
classical thinking as reductive, painting over complexity and sorting individuals into false
systems—numbers, datasets, results—that cannot represent fully human reality.
At first, expressisivism seems far more closely aligned with Romanticism than does
any other composition theory. Certainly, it is the theory that has been most consistently
connected to Romantic ideals within composition scholarship, particularly by its
detractors. Lester Faigley breaks down expressivism’s three Romantic goals: “integrity,”
“spontaneity,” and “originality,” thereby highlighting the theory’s perceived innerdirectedness (529). James Berlin describes the theory as a “descendent of Rousseau on one
hand and of the Romantic recoil from the urban horrors created by nineteenth-century
capitalism on the other” (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 484). In Berlin’s earlier work, the
discussion of expressivism appears under the heading “Subjective Rhetoric,” and focuses
on tracing the movement’s early ties to art and literature, leading to its later focus on “the
cultivation of the singular vision and voice of the student” (Rhetoric and Reality 152).
Overall, expressivism is linked to Romanticism through both its lineage and its focus on
finding inner truth through the writing process. And overall, these Romantic features are
most often singled out as weaknesses. Berlin ultimately faults the theory for its denial of
“the place of intersubjective, social processes in shaping reality” (146), a widely shared
criticism of expressivism by social constructionists of all stripes.
This overview may make it appear that expressivism represented the last gasp
11
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of Romanticism in composition studies, but we argue that this tidy result is far from
the case. By looking more closely at the tenor of the social constructionist critique of
expressivism, the first contours of an alternative, social constructionist Romanticism begin
to surface. Social constructionists criticized expressivism for being myopically focused on
the individual’s subjective experience. A large part of this criticism revolved around the
idea that by focusing on only the student’s inner mind, expressivist theorists neglected the
social constructions within which and by which students write. The student’s social class,
cultural history, and region of the country, the social dynamics of the institution and the
classroom itself—all these made up the student and therefore the student’s orientation
to the writing task. So social constructionists saw expressivism as ultimately reductive—
reducing the student’s complex social situatedness to a too-simple sense of “self.” Social
construction’s fear of reduction, however, is clearly a Romantic fear, as it plays into the
idea that all elements of a whole contribute to its ultimate Quality, and therefore no one
piece should be extracted for measurement or even comment. The self can’t be discussed
apart from the social. Reality can’t be considered apart from the language within which
it is mediated. An essay cannot be considered apart from the dialectal swirl from which
it issues. Berlin’s description of the dialectic is a clear example of the Romantic idea that
no piece can be taken from the whole, and also includes language that is explicitly antiClassical:
The dialectic, moreover, is a complicated process that is not cumulative or arithmetic in
nature; knowledge does not usually result from simply adding or subtracting rhetorical
elements. Instead, meaning comes about as the external world, the conceptions the
writer or speaker brings to the external world, and the audience the writer or speaker is
addressing all simultaneously act on each other during the process of communicating.
(Rhetoric and Reality 167)

And while all this makes intuitive sense (of course we do not want to reduce our
students or the complexity of our work), the fear of reduction itself has led to a new, even
more radical Romanticism, requiring scholars to continually describe more and more of
the social field surrounding the writer at the expense of doing other work. Ignoring the
lesson of Zeno’s paradox and really of social construction itself, researchers dig more and
more deeply toward a “reality” that can never actually be reached. To have any other aim
but to widen this portrait is to be reductive, positivist, Classical, square. This infinite
regress finally creates a scholarship that can blend in almost anything from any other
field, but cannot make distinctions between what is important and what is not, what
works and what does not. Left alone with this ever-expanding interdisciplinary portrait
of the social situatededness of student writers, theorists and teachers must finally lean on
their own subjectivity to make sense or use of what they see—a Romantic predicament.
The isolated, discerning self, then, becomes just as central in social construction as it
was in expressivism. The only difference is that the “self ” here is not the student, but
the teacher—the one who ultimately makes judgments about better and worse, and sets
those judgments into the “positivist” concreteness that is grading. Social constructionists’
argument with expressivism was not a rejection of Romanticism itself, but instead a way
of advocating for a different and ultimately more fanatical Romantic view.
One protest here might be that while social construction may seem Romantic in its
12
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preoccupation with irreducibility, its central claim is anything but. The idea that truth or
reality is socially constructed seems, at first, explicitly anti-Romantic, since Romanticism
is often thought of as a private quest for a fixed and inner truth. Yet Romantic truth itself
resists definition (e.g., the beauty of art is ineffable), just as the antifoundational sociallymediated “truth” in constructionist theory cannot be pinned down, since it is forever in
an irreducible cultural flux. Neither theory, then, provides an assessable goal. We can
never be sure if students in an expressivist classroom have found their inner truth or not,
since we cannot see into their minds. Likewise, we can never be sure if students truly
understand their social situadedness, if they are sufficiently aware of the cultural forces
bearing down on the writing task, or if this awareness has in fact done them any good.
We cannot even be sure if our own classroom presentation of discourse and community is
adequately dynamic, or if we have fallen into harmful reductions. For both expressivism
and social construction, there is no defined end result and therefore no way to know when
a result is achieved. The search for inner truth or the search for any “real” social discourse
are similarly endless processes, and any successes must be intuitively felt rather than
measured or named. Despite the differences in epistemology, both expressivism and social
construction are similarly Romantic in their orientation towards Quality. Both theories
contain a conception of truth that does not lend itself to any measurable outcome—a
shared weakness that produces problematic results, as illustrated particularly when it
comes to assessing writing.
Social Constructionist Assessment as Romantic Enabler
Nowhere do both the extreme Romanticism of social construction and its resistance
to Classical thought stand out more starkly, or to larger effect, than in the area of
assessment. The basic uses of assessment are to decide how well things are going, and then
what you should do more and what you should do less. As we will see, social construction
essentially prevents such judgments by making all assessment an exercise in infinite regress.
The practical result has been a standing critique of all such judgments as “reductive,”
“objectivist,” and, of course, “positivist,” greatly complicating disciplinary decisions about
what to do with assessments, and even whether to conduct them.
We take Brian Huot’s (Re)Articulating Writing Assessment for Teaching and Learning as
the main exemplar of social constructionist assessment. We begin our examination there
precisely because Huot has presented social constructionist assessment so well, and because
his vision in its general scope has been so widely accepted. With expert scholarly method
and considerable rhetorical skill, Huot develops a “new theory and practice of writing
assessment,” establishing the principles that the new practice of writing assessment be
site-based, locally-controlled, context-sensitive, rhetorically-based, and accessible (105).
Thus, assessment in Huot’s view would not ever become what Richard Haswell later called
“RAD” research—replicable, aggregable, and data-supported. Whereas Haswell would
have us build a larger body of research that can be tested by others, accumulated, and
represented in a variety of ways, including as collected data, Huot pointedly insists that
assessment should focus on serving only the precise purposes at hand. Indeed, Huot seems
to reject even the possibility of Haswell’s project, decrying as “positivist” error the very
idea that “human traits … can be measured accurately across individual contexts.” Here,
13
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the Romantic resistance to any reduction and systemizing is made plain. Huot’s reasoning
begins by criticizing this erroneous “classical test theory” as (in part quoting assessment
expert Egon Guba) “based on a positivist philosophy which contends ‘that there exists a
reality out there, driven by immutable natural laws’” (83). Again, we should pause to note
that, apparently, anyone who actually believes there really is a law of gravity might not
agree with Huot’s construct. Such are the extreme philosophical claims in which social
construction genuinely is grounded, a fact too often glossed over. Huot does go on to limit
the range of his claim more carefully, seeking mainly to guard against any assumption that
a complex ability like writing is a “fixed, consistent, and acontextual human trait” (83).
Huot asserts that all positivists would believe that premise—which may be true enough
as it goes, but it does not follow that all believers in a more nuanced realism—such as
Haswell, for instance, whom Huot later praises for his assessment method (106)—are
positivists.
Huot, then, essentially builds a straw scholar, positioning all opponents of social
constructionist assessment as entirely duped by positivist objectivism, with every step
toward objectivism leading inevitably down the slippery slope to “positivism.” In
remarkable, ungrounded leaps, any believer in empirical study of any kind becomes willing
to accept without question or qualm the most dubious and reductive of assessments. As
he notes, “those of us who teach and research literacy have always known that writing
assessment could never be totally objective, and that writing which approached such
objectivity would never be effective communication” (92). Huot also charges that “within
the positivist assumptions that construct and rely on the technology of testing, there is
no need for different sets of procedures depending on context, because writing ability is
a fixed and isolated human trait” (83). Yet it seems patently obvious that a great many
people who understand that writing always has subjective and interpretive aspects also
demonstrate a faith that it also has objectifiable aspects, ideas about reality that can be
shared and tested. It is just as apparent that many non-positivists simply use tests as one
piece of information among many, arrayed to construct a more complete picture of a
complex reality. For instance, Haswell’s call for RAD research (“NCTE/CCCC’s”) makes
plain that his wish is not to use any one measure reductively; quite to the contrary, he
wishes to have us accumulate a vast amount of varied information in ways that we can
“aggregate” to make complex decisions. Huot, speaking accurately and expertly for social
constructionist assessment, posits it as a way to save us from the excesses of positivism, but
his argument simply goes too far. One may in fact believe in a reality that is “out there”
and still believe that this reality is also interpreted rhetorically by discourse communities,
and is extraordinarily difficult to pin down with confidence. That blended belief, in fact,
opens up even more room for interpretation, given that multiple findings from local sites
must then be read and interpreted together within a larger interpretive community—the
RAD approach posited by Haswell.
Furthermore, in the area of assessment we once again find that advocates of social
construction, in part by failing to claim their underlying Romanticism, actually end up
enabling Classical systems with which they cannot adequately contend. Huot notes that
“[at] present, assessment procedures that attempt to fix objectively a student’s ability
to write are based upon an outmoded theory supported by an irrelevant epistemology”
(94). Yet we find little sign that current scholarship roundly condemns grading student
14
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writing, a result that such a statement would seem to demand as a necessary consequence.
Just as social constructionists will (paraphrasing Walker Percy) order a pizza and expect
to get one, they continue to give simplistic, five-category ratings of student ability and
expect people to accept them. Indeed, they do so knowing full well that students, other
schools, and employers do in fact accept grades. Among ourselves, then, apparently we
should “[acknowledge] the indeterminacy of meaning and the importance of individual
and communal interpretations and values” (101). But to the outside world, we may still
unproblematically display our judgments in simplistic grades—and indeed, if anything,
must resist norming them so that they might mean the same thing in different classrooms.
What Huot does not acknowledge is that teachers and theorists must already make
compromises with social construction, since so much of what we do—like grading—
requires us to step outside of our social constructionist (and Romantic) roles. Instead of
making this negotiation a feature of our disciplinary conversation, theorists like Huot
instead simply skip over discussing the parts of our tasks as teachers that are simply too
hard to reconcile. Furthermore, the larger project in which Huot is engaged betrays his
own faith that composition scholars can indeed make meaning together in ways that go
beyond our local sites and contexts. After all, if all knowledge of any kind is always only
local and contextual, then nobody could ever say we should publish and use any particular
theory of writing assessment, either.
The consequence has been a burgeoning field of assessment, but curiously very
little new information about how it is that students become better writers or what
teaching practices produce that result. Of course, those who follow social constructionist
orthodoxy must accuse us of “positivism” for even considering the idea that there is such
a thing as “better” writing outside a local rhetorical context. But there’s the problem.
If our discipline really has no way of saying what is better or worse in any way that
transcends the local site, then we have no means by which to critique anything at all that
teachers might do in their classes. Furthermore, it then becomes obvious that, even locally,
any attempt to enforce a course-wide policy must be similarly flawed; after all, the most
refined and accurate local rhetorical site will be the individual classroom. Indeed, in that
every individual has a different subjective and cultural location and a different construct
of the rhetorical situation, the students themselves are the only ones who can genuinely
assess their own work.
Hence, we can see how the social constructionist paradigm, carried to its own logical
conclusions, produces Romantic, individualist results. In the most Romantic of senses,
WPAs become the heroes of the program, teachers the heroes of their classes, students the
heroes of their writing. Of course, in practice what happens is that whoever in that chain
has the most authority “wins,” and gets to declare what will be valued. Or, all too often,
authority has its center in some other social location, like an excessively literature-focused
English department or a more fully committed positivist somewhere higher up in the
academic administration. Yet much as compositionists complain whenever this authority
gets located somewhere outside the ranks of those who understand composition well, the
ideas underpinning social constructionist assessment theory itself will rule out any resort
to studies or measures that might contradict the narrative offered by those with the power
to impose it. The discourse community in charge, after all, has spoken. Ultimately, being
a form of Romanticism in denial, social construction produces results that simply vacillate
15
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between the Romantic and the Classical, depending on whether the individual or the
system happens to have more power to define a satisfactory result.
Irreducibility and Inaction
Essentially, social constructionist assessments have not had the practical effects they
surely intend. Because such methods are non-replicable and offer no measurable outcomes,
they are neither transferable nor appealing to anyone beyond the relatively small circle of
those already immersed in composition scholarship. The resulting vacuum has been filled
by genuinely positivistic, objectivist assessments sold by testing companies that do not
share our qualms. We rightly decry these assessments, but the problem is that our field’s
critique of such poor methods errs on the Romantic side of the Classic/Romantic split.
Social constructionists are correct in pointing out that these assessments are reductive and
harmful, but they tend to attribute these flaws to the mere existence of Classical, reductive
elements in the assessments—the data, the numbers, etc—rather than anything else.
The problem with this critique is twofold. First, our critique of bad assessments by
outsiders is weakened by our outright rejection of all things Classical. Instead of advocating
for better assessment methods, social constructionists make the unpalatable (especially to
even well-intentioned outsiders) argument that data-driven assessment itself is reductive
and wrongheaded. For those on the periphery of our field, such a sentiment paints
composition scholars as an eccentric band of Romantics, not as professionals with any
authority worth heeding. Secondly, the inability of the field as a whole to create a cache
of knowledge of what works in the classroom has left teachers with little to guide their
practice. Hence, writing teachers must find guidance elsewhere—be it a from a textbook,
a common syllabus, sets of rules and regulations, or from simple social pressure. As should
surprise no one, the two most common kinds of social pressure lead to an “anything
goes” Romanticism and a current-traditional Classicism—too often in a combination that
says, “Leave me alone in my classroom (to teach grammar)!” Social construction, and its
assessment scholarship, advocates for a highly responsive understanding of student writing
in relationship to the social sphere. Yet the radical Romanticism of such scholarship
restricts its influence, which has had the practical effect of leaving huge swaths of the field
untended and therefore vulnerable to outside assessors, uninformed administrators, and
individual teachers whose classroom practices reflect the uncurated range of the history of
composition studies—from retrograde grammar drills to literature study to pure cultural
studies to expressing the inner self, and everywhere in between.
Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance again provides a useful gloss on
composition’s current impasse. The book is both the memoir of the author’s motorcycle
trip with his son and a work of original philosophy concerned with fully exploring why
people get locked into certain styles of thought. Pirsig’s early travel companions, John and
Susan, refuse to work on the mechanics of their motorcycle and demonstrate a resistance
to technology in general. Pirsig begins his exploration by fully describing the differences
between the Romantic mindset, which describes his friends, and the Classical mindset,
which often is seen in good technicians and scientists. Pirsig, using a handful of sand as a
metaphor, describes how differently Classicists and Romantics approach understanding.
The handful of sand looks uniform, at first, but the longer we look at it the more
16

Rhodes and Robinson/ Social Construction

diverse we find it to be. Each grain of sand is different. No two are alike. Classical
understanding is concerned with the piles and the basis for sorting and interrelating them.
Romantic understanding is directed toward the handful of sand before the sorting begins.
Both are valid ways of looking at the world although irreconcilable with each other (9698).
Romantics, with their unwillingness to reduce phenomena into categories, instead
describe all the ways the phenomena might be viewed. A student is both a student and a
member of the classroom discourse community—the school as a whole, the region, the
country, etc. The student is a gender, a race, a class, an age. Cultural, societal, familial,
institutional pressures are all at work. The Romantic, however, does not make these
observations to split the students into groups, but to simply describe the many facets of
their situatededness. Huot refers to this large picture as “contextual integrity,” which is
notable for both its clear articulation of a Romantic value (the whole is more than the
parts), and the whiff of ethical necessity. Pirsig points out that the Romantic can add to a
description indefinitely, since any subject has an infinite context. As Pirsig writes, “You’d
think the process of subdivision and classification would come to an end somewhere, but
it doesn’t. It just goes on and on” (96). Yet as Pirsig later points out, this worldview often
produces a paralysis born of unsorted information:
The overwhelming majority of facts, the sights and sounds that are around us every
second and the relationships among them and everything in our memory...these have no
Quality, in fact have a negative quality. If they were all present at once our consciousness
would be so jammed with meaningless data we couldn’t think or act. (400)

In the case of composition studies, we are overrun with the data of discrete observations
that do not cohere into shared knowledge. Haswell’s study of the 2004 CCCC conference
found that of the 478 presentations, only 17 were RAD scholarship, the majority of such
panels adding a tiny new facet to the contexual portrait of student writers. The problem
with even these studies, as Haswell points out, is that they do not build on one another.
He uses the 2004 article, “Redneck and Hillbilly Discourse in the Writing Classroom:
Classifying Critical Pedagogies of Whiteness,” as an example of scholarship that might add
to the contextual picture of writers, but is not applicable beyond itself. The title typifies
the hyper-specificity that often marks this scholarship, and while the article included
observational data, it was not gathered using any classical methods. “[T]he data do not
much help a scholar who might want to test or add to these facts,” Haswell explains,
“because there is no system by which to sample, elicit, and analyze student response”
(202). His call for RAD scholarship is based on the fact that the field itself has not built
any shared, systemic knowledge, only at best a small pile of one-offs hidden among a
vaster pile of entirely un-RAD discussion.
Pirsig would argue that this result is typical of what a hardline Romantic would
produce, since “Romantic Quality always correlates with instantaneous impressions”—
the context as we see it, a specific moment in the discourse community (316). Social
constructivist composition scholars constantly redraw the picture, with no bit of
knowledge meaningfully building off the past or stretching into the future. Pirsig contrasts
this approach with classical Quality, which is “concerned with more than just the present.
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The relation of the present to the past and future [ is] always considered”( 316). Science is
Classical because knowledge comes from data that are accumulated and tested over time,
so that each study adds to a narrative line of understanding. In composition, the research
is instead a collection of snapshots—of a specific discourse, of a local context, of a cultural
moment. The paralysis of the field that so frustrates Haswell is born of composition’s
unwillingness to review its store of knowledge, to find what is worthy of continued
testing and study. The field, Haswell warns, is at risk of stagnation or even obsolescence
because of this refusal. Pirsig would agree. Under Romanticism, there is “no formal way
of evaluating, no way of acknowledging this Quality...the entire train [of knowledge]
has no way of knowing where to go” (363). Composition studies, through a somewhat
unwitting championing of the Romantic over the Classical, is philosophically opposed
to what is foundational to nearly every other academic discipline—summarizing what it
already knows.
A Way Out: The Idea of Quality
Haswell’s exhaustive study of the state of composition studies reveals two things: one,
that the field is not aggregating its own knowledge, and two, that field indeed has a lot of
knowledge. Composition studies remains a perpetually new field, not because it doesn’t
know enough, but because it has no apparatus for sorting through and verifying what it
knows. Pirsig boils down the problem with being wed to such a Romantic, anti-objective
style of thought: “If Quality is subjective, existing only in the observer, then this Quality
that you make so much of is just a fancy name for whatever you like” (291). If social
construction cannot produce aggregable and summarized findings, how can we know that
the pedagogies or the scholarship is anything more than what that particular scholar liked?
If we cannot test another’s method or idea thereby applying its insights, how can we trust
or make use of the insights? And how can we blame students for so often believing that
our grades reflect simply how much we like them?
Using RAD scholarship more widely is the surface solution, yet this approach would
not get at the root of the philosophical resistance that has thus far shut it out. Before
scholars and journals in the field can generate a truly RAD project of inquiry, there needs
to be a philosophical recalibrating on the most fundamental level. Social construction,
as we have shown, is too limited a worldview to carry the profession forward. Yet part of
the reason why “positivism” remains such a fear, even to those theorists not married to
social construction, is that we do not have an alternative philosophy at the ready that can
meaningfully incorporate Classical thought. A free-floating RAD scholarship, unattached
to any compelling worldview, will make little systematic difference, despite the laudable
recent increase in such scholarship. Social construction, despite its flaws, clearly still
appeals to teachers and scholars, so the strongest option for a new epistemology is one
that can fold in its best features while expanding the types of knowledge we can pursue.
Pirsig’s notion of Quality offers a view of reality that is neither reductive nor
meaninglessly expansive. It can be the backing for RAD and non-RAD scholarship. Most
importantly, it provides a view of reality that makes discernment—the center of assessment
and knowledge-making in general—central. We do not hold that Pirsig’s Metaphysics of
Quality, as the theory has come to be popularly labeled, is the only such solution; but
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we do find it interestingly consistent to explore a potential solution that was originally
worked out in the context of teaching composition—and calling it “rhetoric.” After all,
there remains keen value in attending to local contexts in all their particularity.
Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality emerges slowly in the text of Zen. Because Quality
aims to join Classical and Romantic thinking, Pirsig’s groundwork involves debunking
the perceived differences between the two. One of his first major sections leading into his
idea of Quality is concerned with challenging the idea that the hard sciences are entirely
objective, neutral, and mediated by facts. Essentially, Pirsig argues against the charge of
positivism that so worries theorists like Huot. In his book, Huot contends that classical
thinkers such as mathematicians ignore context and the importance of the observer,
agreeing with Guba that science is “‘context free,’ because the laws revealed by this type of
scientific method are held to be independent of the observer and the particular events in
which they were discovered” (83).
Huot dismisses science as insensible to context in a few lines, and continues on as if
the mattered is settled. Pirsig is puzzled by people like Huot who believe that science is
simply an announced act of detached observation. He uses the mathematician Poincaré
as one example of how classical thinkers nonetheless subjectively make choices based on
context.
[Mathematics] isn’t merely a question of applying rules . . . . It doesn’t merely make
the most combinations possible. The combinations so obtained would be exceedingly
numerous, useless and cumbersome. The true work of the inventor consists in choosing
among these combinations is to eliminate the useless ones . . . . and the rules that must
guide the choice are extremely fine and delicate. It’s almost impossible to state them
precisely; they must be felt rather than formulated. (342)

The selection of methods or facts or observations—a subjective act—is as critical
the work of the sciences. The observer, unlike in Guba’s formulation, is not independent
from the observed. Yet if scientists and mathematicians select from reality, rather than
simply apply rules, then how do they make their selections? What governs their decisions?
And if composition studies were to use RAD methods, how could we be assured that we
are choosing the right methods, the right facts to observe? Pirsig’s central investigation
in Zen is centered on questions like these, since neither the facts of the world nor the
individual filtering of those facts seem to explain reality fully. He uses Poincaré’s view of
mathematical discovery as a critical clue. Poincaré was sure that the discoveries that he had
made did not come from the facts alone, since the facts themselves didn’t automatically
produce a discovery. Instead, it was as if the more interesting and relevant facts eventually
made themselves known and harmonized into an insight. There must be a unconscious
element at play here:
Poincaré then hypothesized that this selection is made by what he called the ‘subliminal
self ’ . . . . The subliminal self, Poincaré said, looks at a large number of solutions to
a problem, but only the interesting ones break into the domain of consciousness.
Mathematical solutions are selected by the subliminal self on the basis of ‘mathematical
beauty,’ of the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. (336)
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Pirsig continues, challenging the idea of science’s objectivity and hence pushing past
Poincaré’s ideas to begin a full articulation of Quality. Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality has
three main parts. First, it recasts reality not as a objective fact nor a subjective construct,
but as a third entity, Quality, that is neither. The subjective and objective are not pitted
against each other as incompatible worldviews. Instead, both are contained under Quality.
The second piece of Pirsig’s philosophy eliminates the romantic/classical dualism by
showing that both are merely ways of reading the same Quality. Finally, Pirsig’s Quality
is dynamic and temporal. It exists in the moment-by-moment choices people make when
ordering their world, the precise way subjective readings play off of objective facts. Quality
is what drives us to choose the interesting facts, to make the discoveries that would be
worthwhile to us just then. As Pirsig puts it, “Quality couldn’t be independently related
with either the subject or object but could be found only in the relationship of the two with
each other. It is the point at which subject and object meet” (304).
Such a philosophy is difficult to summarize, but even this surface description has
promising implications for composition studies. On a basic level, both RAD scholarship
and scholarship concerned with student context could unproblematically coexist, since
both are equally legitimate ways of confronting Quality. In fact, both styles of scholarship
could more easily be seen as interchangeable lenses for viewing student writing, rather
than competing visions of truth. Pirsig emphasizes the idea that even what appear to be
natural or scientific laws are just the best—the most Quality—way of reading the world
at the moment, discussing the idea that we can posit more than one geometry that seems
to correspond with reality:
One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
Geometry is not true, it is advantageous. Poincaré then went on to demonstrate the
conventional nature of other concepts of science, such as space and time, showing that
there isn’t one way of measuring these entities that is more true than another; that which
is generally adopted is only more convenient. (337)

Scientific knowledge and Romantic insight act as complementary languages for
understanding reality; neither are reality itself. This backs up Haswell’s idea that RAD
scholarship, far from being dry and positivist, is actually as just as dynamic and flexible
as any other language. This is why RAD scholarship “may be feminist, empirical,
ethonomethodological, contextual, action liberatory, or critical” (201). Beyond the
versatility of what could be studied, the resulting data itself is plastic. The information
“doesn’t just lie there” but is “potentialized,” its value being its “capacity for growth—its
comparability, replicablility, and accruability” (202). The data that jump out at us—the
surprising change in sentence length, the similarity of arguments in a certain region—
would be the kinds of Quality facts that would lead to more studies and discoveries. Social
constructionists see hard data as confining and controlling. But under the idea of Quality,
we are in complete control of how we view the data, and the information itself will make
its Quality known.
Pirsig’s philosophy provides, among other things, a framework for valuing the
intuition and the serendipity that accompanies intellectual discovery. In some ways,
Quality validates what he calls “preintellectual reality,” that Romantic sense of rightness.
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The moment a teacher sees something striking in her classroom is just as much a part of
Quality as reams and reams of numerical data about student writing. They are equally
weighted, both parts of the same whole. The Quality is in how they interact. Perhaps
the teacher’s intuition led to a RAD study that others are building upon in their own
classrooms. Or perhaps she consulted older data on student writing after her class, and
her insight helped her see a trend in the numbers that no one else had. Under the idea of
Quality, the Romantic and the Classic symbiotically move knowledge forward.
We need not turn only to Pirsig for such models, though we might pause to consider
carefully the way forward suggested by a work that serves so well to diagnose the current
problem. In ways far too involved to address here, strains of philosophical pragmatism
urged by composition scholars such as Ann Berthoff and Thomas Kent have addressed
these same problems in great detail—and in ways that should certainly give comfort to
anyone who fears a lapse into outright positivism. What seems most clear is that the field
needs to move on. Social construction has had its uses, but it has become too comfortable
an oasis. It’s time to pack up and move on down the road.
ç
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